| 31.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| Michael said it all better than I probably ever could in his "Time To Say Goodbye" explaining the shuttered doors here at Across the Pond, but let me add a few notes. This blog brought me a lot of satisfaction for all the reasons Mr. Knigge mentioned -- it succeeded, if I may toot our own horn, beyond my wildest dreams, by getting picked up by the Los Angeles Timeses and Time magazines and the like, and by inspiring fevered debate amongst readers, and in countless other ways. It also had value to me beyond whether anyone saw it; the daily demand of blogging forced me to pay close attention to developing story lines and policy shifts and thereby enhanced my understanding of foreign policy, so I learned a good deal along the way. Michael made me blush with his kind words, but another joy of the site was reading his work. Not only does the man truly understand U.S. politics and policy, but it was a constant delight getting his perspective on the practices of the U.S. government and candidates for office thereof. He had a special talent for catching our absurdities that only someone who didn't live here would notice, and for contrasting how we do things on this side of the pond to how they do things on his side, and it was always illuminating. Before, during and after Barack Obama's Germany trip, he made this blog THE go-to site for information and analysis, in my opinion. And he's a true pal. If you're a regular reader, I encourage you to continue to check out all the "interesting links" along the right hand rail in lieu of us. If you value regular insights on foreign policy and politics, my friends at Foreign Policy, Porch Dog and elsewhere will leave you in good hands. DW-WORLD, too, is a great source of foreign policy information whether or not you're from Germany or focused on German news. Thanks to Michael, thanks to Deutsche Welle and thanks to all the readers over the last year who dropped by, gave us a look, offered their quality insights and smacked us around. Farewell. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 27.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| With President Obama set to announce a new strategy for Afghanistan, it's worth examining the intelligence problem posed by that country. It is, by any measure, daunting. Max Bergmann recently wrote that saying Afghanistan is "harder" than Iraq is "Monday morning quarterbacking." After all, the United States muddled through Iraq for years before things stabilized somewhat. He has a point. And although he says the question isn't very helpful, he makes an eloquent case for it being directly relevant to the whole question of the U.S. strategy: "If we are truly committed to Afghanistan and believe that it is harder than Iraq, shouldn’t we be committing more resources and manpower to Afghanistan than we did in Iraq?" But is Bergmann right that Afghanistan isn't "harder?" At a media roundtable I attended as a reporter for CQ, U.S. spy chief Dennis Blair said this: "We know a heck of a lot more about Iraq on a granular level than we know about Afghanistan." He was answering a question from a reporter who relayed a tale -- from not so long ago -- where military forces in Afghanistan relied on maps featuring non-existent villages. Blair said the problem went beyond maps to basic understandings of local power structures. The United States has been in Afghanistan longer than it has been in Iraq, so the number of years spent muddling is secondary. Afghanistan IS harder, or the considerable gap between American resources spent on Iraq and Afghanistan means the United States has come to figure out Iraq in a way that it hasn't Afghanistan. Or it's both. Whatever the case, as of now, Afghanistan is harder than Iraq. Recent news reports about a Rand study on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan focused primarily on Afghanistan. The intelligence failures there, according to the Guardian, "border on the absurd." Blair said the intelligence community may have a fair assessment of the overall situation in Afghanistan, but when it comes to tactical intelligence used to support operations, the spy agencies have a long way to go. And since according to the new strategy, more troops will be sent, that almost assuredly means more operations. That makes the improvement of tactical intelligence in Afghanistan vital to success there. And that won't be easy. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 23.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| Early returns are that Obama's plan to reach out to nations hostile to America isn't going to be easy. Venezuela's Chavez calls Obama "ignoramus" Iran’s Supreme Leader Rebuffs Obama Message |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 20.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| There's no doubt that President Barack Obama's video message to the Iranian government and leadership was a bold move. It's won both considerable praise and heated denouncements. But my question is this: What impact can it have if nobody saw it? The AP writes, via Think Progress: "It wasn’t clear how many Iranians were able to see the video, which was not aired on state television in Iran on Friday. It was likely shown on Farsi-language TV stations beamed in from outside of the country, but many Iranians don’t watch television in the first days of long Nowruz holiday that is normally filled with family gatherings or vacations away from home." And seeing it on YouTube isn't a really viable option, either, since the Iranian government blocks the website. About the only place an Iranian citizen could go to watch it is the White House website. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 18.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| Two weeks ago, I asked what options the U.S. had for dealing with Iran. Since, Michael has addressed one, and now my CQ colleague Adam Graham-Silverman has addressed some others. The AGS piece is focused primarily on talks -- in contrast with the tea leaf reading from some that the U.S. was laying the groundwork for abandoning engagement -- but it delves into other options, too, paraphrasing an expert pertinent to all of this, Dennis Ross: "Tighten the noose of sanctions, engage without conditions, or pursue a hybrid option that combines negotiation and pressure." The rest of AGS' exploration is worth reading as well. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 15.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| Two analyses on Sunday about the Obama foreign policy: Fareed Zakaria praises Obama's foreign policy activity thus far, noting changes of direction on Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan. The Guardian's Jonathan Freeland notes many of the same things, plus Obama activity on Cuba, Israel and others. Both pieces leave out the missteps of the administration on foreign policy, like the failed appointment of Charles Freeman to the National Intelligence Council or the gaffe with Hillary Clinton and the Russia "reset button." But I think at least one part of their thrust is unquestionably true: It's been a busy early period on foreign policy for an administration that might be expected to focus almost all of its energy on the economy. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 14.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| In this week's edition of CQ Weekly, I examined the recent statements of Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that the economic crisis was the "primary near-term security concern" of the United States. He made the remarks weeks ago, and it got headlines. But no one, it seemed, had asked the next question: OK, what are the ramifications of that? So I set about asking, and found that some people disagreed with the premise. Many saw a link between the economy and security -- after all, Al Qaeda has long made the connection, with Osama bin Laden pledging a "bleed-until-bankruptcy" strategy in 2004 -- but not to the degree Blair did. What's more, some questioned what good it would do for the intelligence community to involve itself in the question. Almost everyone I called -- some quoted in the piece, some not -- told me, "I'm so glad someone is asking these questions. I don't understand why no one has yet." If you're not in the United States, the issue may still have ramifications for you, too. So, consider reading the piece, linked above, then if you're an early riser in the U.S., check me out on C-SPAN talking about all of it Monday at 8:30 a.m. EST. Failing that, C-SPAN's website rebroadcasts its programming on its website. |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 11.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| There are a lot of strong opinions out there about what Chas Freeman's withdrawal from the top National Intelligence Council position means. It could mean the Israel lobby did him in. It could mean the Saudi lobby isn't as powerful as sometimes thought. It could mean the Obama administration once again failed to properly vet one of its would-be officials. It could mean that Freeman was just plain controversial, and on more than Israel. There's no way to do what I'm about to do without sounding wishy-washy; besides, as a reporter at CQ who covers intelligence, it would be inappropriate for me to go throwing my opinions around about any of this. My role here is more as an analyst. But ponder the following: What if all of the above is true? What if the Israel lobby did help do in Freeman, and the Saudi lobby didn't have the ability to offer a powerful counterpoint to complaints that Freeman worked for an organization funded in part by Saudi Arabia? What if it should be controversial when a would-be intelligence official calls the 2008 Tibetan uprisings against China "race riots," and why didn't anyone in the Obama administration take a look at Freeman's associations and statements, realize they were potentially very controversial, then think twice? |
||||||||
|
||||||||
| 10.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| What is with this whole thing where a president allegedly establishes his foreign policy based on what happened to his dad? | ||||||||
|
||||||||
| 03.03.2009 |
|
||||||||
| Some senior U.S. official really is getting around, talking about what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is telling key Arab leaders about Iran. "It's doubtful that Iran would respond" to engagement, she said, according to that official. It's all been interpreted as a sign that the U.S. is already moving away from President Obama's campaign idea to meet with Iran. So what does that leave? Well, for one, according to the L.A. Times, "it could help persuade U.S. allies to join it in increasing pressure on the Islamic regime," since Clinton said that Iran rebuffing overtures to Iran "would quell complaints that the United States has not exhausted diplomatic routes." Clinton said "that Iran's 'worst nightmare is an international community that is united and an American government willing to engage Iran,' according to the State official." In particular, Russia and European allies getting on board with additional Iran sanctions they've resisted in the past would be a new step. The L.A. Times mentioned a few more steps: efforts to solicit Iran to help stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan, creating a little U.S.-Iran collaboration, as well as new commitments toward U.S. and international disarmament that would persuade Iran to follow that lead. There does seem to be consensus -- unlike prior to Iraq, when the IAEA and others were skeptical -- that Iran is on the path to a nuclear weapon. Maybe that has created new pressure to move beyond engagement? |
||||||||
|
||||||||